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ABSTRACT	
In	 this	 paper,	 we	 examine	 whether	 the	 economic	 bond	 between	 an	 individual	
engagement	partner	and	client	threatens	auditor	independence	and	thus	audit	quality.	
We	also	investigate	if	auditor’s	good	economic	position	acts	as	a	safeguard	against	this	
economic	bond.	Using	a	sample	of	peer	reviewed	individual	audit	engagements	of	264	
Finnish	auditors	we	examine	whether	the	client’s	economic	size	is	likely	to	affect	audit	
quality	as	measured	by	 the	degree	of	compliance	with	audit	standards	(peer	review).	
Furthermore,	 using	 taxable	 earned	 (salaries)	 and	 unearned	 (capital	 gains)	 income	
information	of	auditors	we	investigate	if	high	income	level	of	an	auditor	diminishes	the	
risk	of	financial	self-interest	threat.	Our	results	provide	evidence	that	Finnish	auditors	
show	a	very	high	independence	although	big	client’s	economic	size	(turnover)	weakly	
affects	 audit	 quality.	 There	 is	 weak	 evidence	 that	 auditors	 are	 likely	 to	 show	 higher	
quality	for	larger	clients.	Our	results	also	suggest	that	this	financial	self-interest	threat	
can	 be	 safeguarded	 by	 auditor’s	 high	 unearned	 income	 level	 diluting	 the	 economic	
bond	with	the	client.	Unearned	income	acts	here	as	a	proxy	for	economic	wealth.	
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INTRODUCTION	It	 is	 important	 that	 an	 auditor	 provides	 all	 customers	with	 equal	 quality.	 In	 this	 paper,	 we	examine	whether	the	economic	bond	between	an	individual	engagement	partner	and	the	client	threatens	 auditor	 independence	 and	 thus	 audit	 quality.	 Furthermore,	 we	 investigate	 if	auditor’s	high	income	acts	as	a	safeguard	diluting	this	economic	bond.	Since	the	risk	of	audit	quality	 impairment	 is	higher	when	auditor’s	 independence	 is	 impaired	 (DeAngelo	1981),	we	investigate	 if	 client’s	 economic	 size	 has	 an	 influence	 on	 audit	 quality	 (as	measured	 by	 peer	review).	When	 literature	presents	 several	 safeguards	 (financial	 independence)	 to	 inhibit	 the	self-interest	 threats	 (dependence	 on	 total	 fees	 from	 an	 assurance	 client,	 concern	 about	 the	possibility	 of	 losing	 the	 engagement,	 or	 contingent	 fees)	 relating	 to	 assurance	 engagement	affecting	audit	quality,	we	examine	whether	the	audit	quality	can	be	improved	by	using	one	of	these	safeguards	(earned	and	unearned	income	as	a	measure	of	economic	independence	of	an	auditor).			In	various	contexts,	it	has	been	required	that	auditors	should	identify	and	evaluate	threats	to	their	 independence	 and	 reduce	 them	 to	 an	 acceptable	 level.	 Economic	 rents	 associated	with	audit	 fees	 create	 an	 economic	bond	between	auditor	 and	 client	 (DeAngelo	1981;	Magee	 and	
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Tseng	1990).	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 in	 order	 to	 retain	 these	 revenues,	 auditors	will	 compromise	their	 independence.	 The	 seminal	 paper	 of	 DeAngelo	 (1981)	 suggests	 that	 large	 audit	 firms	supply	 higher	 audit	 quality	 since	 large	 auditors	 are	more	 economically	 independent	 from	 a	single	 client	 and	 have	more	 to	 lose	 by	 compromising	 audit	 quality.	 Empirical	 research	 after	DeAngelo	 (1981)	 has	 generated	 mixed	 evidence.	 Some	 studies	 have	 found	 auditor	independence	 impairment	 to	 be	 associated	 with	 economic	 bond	 (e.g.	 Frankel	 et	 al.	 2002;	Knechel	et	al.	2013).	Some	studies	found	no	evidence	for	this	association	(DeFond	et	al.	2002;	Lennox	1999;	Hardies	et	al.	2012).		DeAngelo	(1981)	examined	the	influence	of	economic	bond	at	the	audit	firm	level.	However,	it	has	been	argued	that	it	would	not	be	the	appropriate	level	to	investigate	auditor	independence	impairment	(Tepalagul	and	Lin	2015).	Because	engagement	partner	and	local	offices	will	suffer	relatively	 more	 than	 large	 audit	 firms	 when	 losing	 a	 client	 (DeFond	 and	 Francis	 2005;	Reynolds	 and	 Francis	 2001),	 studies	 have	 started	 to	 investigate	 the	 relationship	 between	economic	 bonding	 and	 auditor	 independence	 at	 the	office-level	 (e.g.,	 Craswell	 et	 al.	 2002;	 Li	2009;	Reynolds	and	Francis	2001).	These	studies	did	not	found	any	support	for	the	claim	that	economic	bonding	in	terms	of	higher	fees	will	lead	to	auditor	independence	impairment.	
 DeFond	 et	 al.	 (2005)	 suggested	 studying	 economic	 bond	 between	 individual	 engagement	partner	 and	 the	 client.	 This	 relationship	 has	 been	 considered	 to	 be	 as	 important	 as	 the	 one	between	the	audit	firm	and	the	client	(Miller	1992;	Wallman	1996).	It	has	also	been	suggested	that	 audit	 process	 is	 affected	 by	 the	 task-performing	 auditor	 (Church	 et	 al.	 2008).	 Evidence	shows	 that	 audit	 engagement	 partners	 make	 the	 most	 important	 decisions	 in	 every	 audit	engagement	 (Chin	 and	Chi	 2009;	Reichelt	 and	Wang	2010).	 Furthermore,	 a	 specific	 client	 is	considered	more	 likely	 to	be	economically	 important	 for	an	audit	partner	than	for	 the	entire	firm	or	local	office	(Hardies	et	al.	2012).		Despite	of	 these	observations	 it	 is	still	unknown	how	individual	partners	trade	off	 individual	losses	or	benefits	 against	 the	 loss	of	 quasi-rents	 for	partnership	 as	 a	whole	 (Simunic	2003).	Anyhow,	 it	 is	 obvious	 that	 engagement	 partners	 recognize	 that	 developing	 or	 maintaining	clients	will	lead	to	career	advancement	and	that	losing	a	client	will	damage	their	career	(Miller	1992).	Hence,	economic	bonding	may	increase	the	individual	engagement	partner’s	willingness	to	compromise	audit	quality.		Thus,	 individual	 audit	 engagement	 partner	 level	 can	 be	 a	 seminal	 starting	 point	 to	 study	economic	bonding.	However,	prior	research	at	this	level	has	been	very	limited	due	to	the	lack	of	relevant	data	(Hardies	et	al.	2012;	Knechel	et	al.	2013).	Hardies	et	al.	(2012)	reported	only	two	studies	that	had	investigated	the	relationship	between	auditor	independence	impairment	and	fee	revenues	at	the	audit	partner	level.	Chen	et	al.	(2010)	reported	that client	importance,	measured	at	the	individual	auditor	level,	but	not	at	the	audit	office	or	firm	level,	impairs	audit	quality	 in	China	 in	 terms	of	a	 lower	probability	of	modified	audit	opinion	 issuance.	Chi	et	al.	(2010)	found	no	evidence	that	individual	partners	compromise	independence	for	economically	important	clients.			The	third	study	at	 this	 level	 is	Hardies	et	al.	 (2012)	that	used	Belgian	data	 to	 investigate	 the	relationship	 between	 auditor	 independence	 impairment	 and	 economic	 bond	 between	individual	engagement	partner	and	his	or	her	client.	Their	results	provided	no	evidence	 that	client’s	economic	importance	negatively	affects	auditor	independence.	In	addition,	Knechel	et	al.	 (2013)	 used	 Swedish	 data	 to	 show	 that	 for	 distressed	 firms	 the	 client’s	 economic	importance	 increased	 and	 the	 auditor’s	 wealth	 (as	 a	 safeguard)	 decreased	 the	 auditor’s	
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propensity	 to	 give	 a	 modified	 (going	 concern)	 audit	 opinion.	 However,	 for	 bankrupt	 and	equity-lost	firms	the	effect	of	the	auditor’s	wealth	was	found	insignificant.		Hardies	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 and	 Knechel	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 selected	 their	 countries	 of	 source	 data	 for	several	reasons	(Belgium	and	Sweden,	respectively).	Some	of	them	are	valid	also	in	this	study	where	we	are	using	Finnish	data.	Hardies	et	al.	(2012)	argue	that	ideal	setting	to	test	auditor	impairment	is	the	one	with	low	reputation	risk	(i.e.	private	firms	with	few	shareholders)	and	low	litigation	risk.	In	this	kind	of	environment	auditor	incentives	favor	avoiding	the	loss	of	the	client	 (Knechel	 and	Vanstraelen	 2007).	 The	 environments	 for	 auditors	 in	 these	 respects	 are	largely	 similar	 in	Belgium,	 Sweden,	 and	Finland.	Thus,	 Finnish	data	provides	us	with	a	 good	environment	to	examine	the	influence	of	economic	bonding	on	auditor	independence.			Finnish	data	make	 it	 also	possible	 to	 examine	auditor’s	 safeguard	against	 economic	bonding	nearly	 in	 the	 same	way	as	 in	Sweden	 (Knechel	et	al.	2013).	 In	Finland	all	 tax	 information	of	taxable	 income	 is	public	making	 it	 possible	 to	 assess	 the	 economic	 importance	of	 a	 client	 in	relation	 to	auditor’s	yearly	 income.	For	 this	purpose,	we	have	collected	both	earned	 (annual	salaries)	 and	unearned	 income	 (capital	 gains)	 figures	 for	 all	 Finnish	 auditors	 in	 our	 sample.	Thus,	we	can	on	the	one	hand	measure	the	importance	of	a	client	to	an	auditor	as	the	client’s	size;	on	the	other	hand	measure	the	absolute	income	level	of	an	auditor	as	a	safeguard	against	economic	bonding	(cf.	Knechel	et	al.	2013).		Instead	 of	 measuring	 audit	 quality	 with	 timely	 modified	 audit	 opinions	 or	 discretionary	accruals	as	in	previous	studies	we	are	using	the	Peer	Review	Quality	results	of	a	national	office,	Finnish	Central	Chamber	of	Commerce.	 	We	 think	 that	Engagements	Reviews	are	even	more	direct	 test	 of	 auditor	 independence	 than	modified	 audit	 opinions	 or	 earnings	 management.	Instead	of	 client’s	 total	 assets	 (Chen	et	al.	2010,	Chi	et	al.	2010)	or	audit	 fees	 (Hardies	et	al.	2012)	we	are	using	client’s	 (private	 firm)	 turnover	as	a	proxy	 for	 client’s	economic	size	and	importance	 for	 auditor.	 The	 turnover	 captures	 and	 reflects	 also	 other	 economic	 values	 than	audit	fee,	e.g.	the	economic	significance	of	a	client	in	society	and	thus	marketing	and	reputation	value	for	an	auditor.			This	 paper	 makes	 several	 contributions	 to	 the	 existing	 audit	 research.	 First,	 we	 are	contributing	to	the	scarce	literature	that	examines	audit	quality	at	individual	engagement	level	(e.g.,	Chen	et	al.	2010;	Francis	and	Yu	2009;	Hardies	et	al.	2012;	Knechel	et	al.	2013).	Second,	we	 are	 extending	 the	 study	 by	 Hardies	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 using	 a	 measure	 of	 client’s	 economic	importance	including	both	the	client’s	sales	(size)	and	the	auditor’s	taxable	income	level	 into	the	analysis.	In	this	perspective,	our	study	has	similarities	with	Knechel	et	al.	(2013).	Third,	we	use	an	audit	quality	measure	that	has	not	earlier	been	examined	in	this	context;	peer	review	quality	 results	 (compliance	 with	 audit	 standards).	 Hardies	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 and	 Knechel	 et	 al.	(2013)	 measure	 audit	 quality	 as	 a	 propensity	 to	 give	 a	 modified	 opinions	 to	 clients	 that	represent	 a	material	 portion	of	 their	 client	 portfolio.	 Fourth,	we	 also	 test	 for	 Finnish	data	 if	auditor’s	 economic	 position	 can	 act	 as	 safeguard	 against	 potentially	 impaired	 quality	 for	randomly	selected	firms.	Knechel	et	al.	(2013)	tested	this	kind	of	hypothesis	for	Swedish	data	only	in	special	circumstances	(distressed,	equity-lost,	and	bankrupt	firms).		We	will	show	that	both	the	audit	quality	and	the	independence	of	Finnish	auditors	are	at	a	very	high	 level	although	client’s	economic	size	(in	 terms	of	 turnover)	weakly	affects	audit	quality.	There	is	found	weak	evidence	that	auditors	are	likely	to	show	higher	quality	for	larger	clients.	Thus,	Finnish	auditors	are	not	willing	 to	compromise	audit	quality	due	 to	economic	bonding	but	merely	to	use	a	strategy	to	build	a	reputation	by	providing	higher	than	expected	quality	for	important	 clients.	 Our	 results	 also	 suggest	 that	 this	 financial	 self-interest	 threat	 can	 be	
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safeguarded	 by	 auditor’s	 high	 unearned	 income	 (capital	 gains)	 level	 diluting	 the	 economic	bond	with	the	client.	Unearned	income	acts	in	this	context	as	a	proxy	for	economic	wealth.	
 The	remainder	of	this	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	In	the	next	section,	we	shortly	discuss	the	nature	of	peer	review	information	which	plays	the	central	role	in	our	study.	In	that	section,	we	describe	peer	review	systems	 in	Europe,	and	 the	Finnish	audit	environment	 to	enlighten	 the	special	 context	 for	 the	 study.	 	 In	 the	 third	 section,	 we	 discuss	 our	 research	 questions	 and	hypotheses.	 In	section	 four	we	present	our	research	methodology	and	data.	The	 fifth	section	reports	 our	 overall	 results.	 Finally,	 the	 study	 ends	 with	 section	 six,	 including	 a	 general	discussion	of	our	results,	the	limitations	of	our	research,	and	suggestions	for	future	research.	
	
PEER	REVIEW	QUALITY	INFORMATION	
Europe	In	 Europe,	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Council	 gave	 2006	 directive	 (Directive	2006/43/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	17	May	2006	on	statutory	audits	of	annual	accounts	and	consolidated	accounts,	amending	Council	Directives	78/660/EEC	and	83/349/EEC	 and	 repealing	 Council	 Directive	 84/253/EEC)	 that	 stipulates	Quality	 assurance	systems	 in	Member	 states.	 	 According	 to	 directive,	 each	Member	 State	 shall	 ensure	 that	 all	statutory	 auditors	 and	 audit	 firms	 are	 subject	 to	 a	 system	 of	 quality	 assurance	 which	 is	organized	in	such	a	manner	that	it	is	independent	of	the	reviewed	statutory	auditors	and	audit	firms	 and	 the	 persons	 who	 carry	 out	 quality	 assurance	 reviews	 shall	 have	 appropriate	professional	 education	 and	 relevant	 experience	 in	 statutory	 audit	 and	 financial	 reporting	combined	with	specific	training	on	quality	assurance	reviews.		Furthermore,	the	selection	of	reviewers	for	specific	quality	assurance	review	assignments	shall	be	 effected	 in	 accordance	with	 an	 objective	 procedure	 designed	 to	 ensure	 that	 there	 are	 no	conflicts	 of	 interest	 between	 the	 reviewers	 and	 the	 statutory	 auditor	 or	 audit	 firm	 under	review.	The	quality	assurance	review	shall	be	 the	subject	of	a	report	which	shall	contain	 the	main	 conclusions	 of	 the	 quality	 assurance	 review	 and	 quality	 assurance	 reviews	 shall	 take	place	at	least	every	six	years.	The	recommendations	of	quality	reviews	shall	be	followed	up	by	the	 statutory	 auditor	 or	 audit	 firm	 within	 a	 reasonable	 period.	 If	 the	 recommendations	referred	are	not	followed	up,	the	statutory	auditor	or	audit	firm	shall,	if	applicable,	be	subject	to	the	system	of	disciplinary	actions	or	penalties.		National	legislation	in	Finland	(the	Finnish	Auditing	Act	459/2007)	stipulates	the	execution	of	Audit	directive.	According	to	24	§	auditor	has	to	assure	the	quality	of	his	audits	and	participate	quality	assurance	review	defined	in	40	§.	Quality	assurance	reviews	in	Finland	are	managed	by	the	Finnish	Central	Chamber	of	Commerce.		
Finland	
Audit	environment	in	Finland	The	audit	market	in	Finland	is	divided	to	two	tiers.	First-tier	auditors	are	called	KHT	auditors.	Second-tier	auditors	are	called	HTM	auditors.	Becoming	a	first-tier	auditor	requires	a	Master’s	Degree.	KHT	exam	has	a	low	passing	rate	and	it’s	considered	to	be	more	demanding	than	HTM	exam.	 Both	 of	 the	 exams	 require	 also	 three	 years	 of	 auditing	 experience	 as	 a	 prerequisite.		Future	 first-tier	auditors	have	to	be	 in	supervision	of	another	 first-tier	auditor,	which	makes	the	requirement	a	bit	more	challenging	for	them.	(Knechel,	Niemi	&	Sundgren	2008:	67.)			First-tier	 auditors	 are	 approved	and	 supervised	by	 the	Central	Chamber	of	Commerce	while	second-tier	 auditor	 are	 approved	 and	 supervised	 by	 regional	 Chambers	 of	 Commerce.	 The	
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largest	companies	and	all	listed	companies	in	Finland	are	required	to	hire	a	first-tier	auditor.	Because	 of	 this	 limitation	 the	 clients	 of	 second-tier	 auditors	 are	mostly	 small	 and	medium-sized	companies.	(Niemi	2004:	545.)			The	Finnish	Auditing	Act	 states	 that	 if	 two	of	 the	 following	criteria	are	met,	 an	entity	has	 to	choose	a	first-tier	auditor:	1. Total	assets	are	over	25	million	euro	2. Gross	revenues	exceed	50	million	euro	3. Number	of	personnel	is	over	300	on	average	(The	Finnish	Auditing	Act	2007/459)		Only	 the	small	entities	 in	Finland	can	choose	not	 to	be	audited.	From	three	criteria	only	one	can	be	exceeded	if	a	company	wants	to	remain	unaudited.	Not	only	financial	information	of	the	previous	fiscal	year	is	significant	but	also	the	year	before	that.	The	three	criteria	are	as	follows:	1. Total	assets	are	over	100	000	euro	2. Gross	revenues	exceed	200	000	euro	3. Number	of	personnel	is	over	3	on	average.	(The	Finnish	Auditing	Act	2007/459)		In	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 year	 2015	 there	 were	 780	 first-tier	 auditors	 and	 637	 second-tier	auditors	 in	 Finland.	 In	 addition	 to	 that	 there	 are	 38	 first-tier	 audit	 firms	 and	32	 second-tier	audit	firms	in	Finland	(The	Auditing	Board	of	The	Central	Chamber	of	Commerce	2015).				
Quality	assurance	reviews	The	 Finnish	Auditing	Act	 requires	 all	 auditors	 in	 Finland	 to	 participate	 in	 quality	 assurance	reviews.	 Quality	 assurance	 review	 will	 be	 conducted	 every	 third	 year	 for	 auditors	 auditing	public	 interest	 entities	 and	 every	 sixth	 year	 for	 other	 auditors.	 (The	 Auditing	 Board	 of	 The	Central	Chamber	of	Commerce	2015).	Reviews	of	audit	 firms	auditing	public	 interest	entities	are	 conducted	 by	 a	 quality	 assurance	 team.	 Typically	 this	 team	 includes	 2-6	 people	 and	 its	purpose	is	to	identify	target	areas	which	the	audit	firms	have	to	develop	further	to	ensure	good	quality.	(The	Auditing	Board	of	The	Central	Chamber	of	Commerce	2015).			The	 Quality	 Section	 set	 up	 by	 the	 Auditing	 Board	 of	 The	 Central	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	supervises	 and	 instructs	 the	 quality	 assurance	 process.	 The	 head	 of	 the	 section,	 quality	assurance	director,	composes	an	annual	quality	assurance	plan	 for	 individual	auditors	which	define	 for	 example	 auditors	 who	 will	 be	 reviewed	 and	 who	 will	 conduct	 the	 review.	 The	Auditing	Board	then	accepts	the	plan	for	first-tier	auditors	and	Auditing	committees	of	regional	Chambers	 of	 Commerce	 for	 second-tier	 auditors.	 Quality	 assurance	 reviewers	 are	 other	professional	 auditors.	 Quality	 assurance	 reviews	were	 started	 in	 2009	 and	 in	 the	 period	 of	2009–2011	altogether	412	quality	assurance	reviews	have	been	conducted.	When	the	six-year	quality	assurance	period	ends	in	2013	practically	all	the	auditors	in	Finland	are	reviewed	once.		(The	Auditing	Board	of	The	Central	Chamber	of	Commerce	2015).		
Reliability	of	peer	review	quality	Results	 of	 the	 peer	 review	 process	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	 direct	 indicator	 of	 audit	 quality.	However,	 there	 might	 be	 some	 concerns	 about	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 peer	 review	 process.	Wallace	 (1991)	 notes	 that	 these	 concerns	 about	 moral	 hazards	 related	 to	 peer	 reviewer,	potential	selection	biases	and	timeliness	of	the	reports	are	anyhow	without	a	merit.	There	have	been	a	 few	studies	 that	 link	peer	 review	results	 to	audit	quality.	Colbert	and	Murray	 (1998)	find	 that	bigger	auditors	 receive	better	 results	 from	peer	 reviews	and	 that	previous	 reviews	help	getting	better	results	from	latter	reviews.				Casterella	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 link	 the	 results	 of	 the	 peer	 review	process	 to	 proprietary	 files	 of	 an	
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insurance	 company	 indicating	 audit	 failures	 (litigation	 risk)	 and	 conclude	 that	 peer	 reviews	are	an	effective	measure	of	actual	audit	quality.	Hilary	and	Lennox	(2005)	 find	 that	auditors	receiving	clean	reports	gain	clients	while	auditors	with	modified	or	adverse	reports	lose	them,	which	indicates	that	clients	also	consider	that	peer	review	ratings	are	an	effective	measure	of	audit	quality.	
	
RESEARCH	HYPOTHESES	
Economic	bonding	In	 literature	auditor	 independence	 is	defined	as	 the	 (conditional)	probability	 that	an	auditor	will	 report	 a	discovered	 breach	 (Watts	 and	 Zimmerman	 1981,	 1986;	 DeAngelo	 1981).	 It	 is	argued	that	economic	rents	associated	with	audit	 fees	create	an	economic	bond	between	the	auditor	 and	 client	 that	 can	 jeopardize	 auditor’s	 independence	 (DeAngelo	 1981;	 Magee	 and	Tseng	 1990).	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 in	 order	 to	 retain	 these	 revenues,	 auditors	 may	compromise	their	 independence	 leading	to	 impaired	quality	(DeFond	et	al.	2002;	Craswell	et	al.	2002;	Hope	and	Langli	2010).	Thus,	auditors	should	 identify	and	evaluate	 threats	 to	 their	independence	 and	 reduce	 them	 to	 an	 acceptable	 level.	 Evidence	 on	 economic	 bonding	 is	however	mixed.	Some	studies	have	found	auditor	 independence	impairment	to	be	associated	with	economic	bond	(e.g.	Frankel	et	al.	2002;	Knechel	et	al.	2013)	whereas	some	studies	found	no	evidence	for	this	association	(DeFond	et	al.	2002;	Lennox	1999;	Hardies	et	al.	2012).		Evidence	on	economic	bonding	depends	on	 the	 level	of	relationship	considered.	Research	on	bonding	 is	recently	begun	to	study	audit	engagement	partners	on	an	 individual	auditor	 level	instead	 of	 local	 and	 national	 audit	 firm	 levels	 (DeFond	 and	 Francis	 2005;	 Chen	 et	 al.	 2010;	Hardies	et	al.	2012;	Knechel	et	al.	2013).	This	relationship	between	an	individual	audit	partner	and	the	client	has	been	considered	as	important	as	the	relationship	between	the	audit	firm	and	the	 client	 (Miller	 1992;	 Wallman	 1996).	 It	 has	 also	 been	 suggested	 that	 audit	 process	 is	affected	by	the	 task	performing	auditor	(Church	et	al.	2008).	Engagement	partners	make	the	most	 important	 decisions	 in	 every	 audit	 engagement,	 since	 they	 plan	 and	 implement	 the	engagement	and	ultimately	determine	the	type	of	audit	report	to	be	issued	to	the	client	(Chin	and	Chi	2009;	Reichelt	and	Wang	2010).	Furthermore,	a	specific	client	is	also	considered	more	likely	to	be	economically	as	important	for	an	audit	partner	as	for	the	entire	audit	firm	or	local	office	(Hardies	et	al.	2012).	Chen	et	al.	 (2010)	 found	that	client	 importance	measured	on	the	individual	auditor	level,	but	not	on	the	audit	office	or	firm	level,	impairs	audit	quality	in	China	in	 terms	 of	 a	 lower	 probability	 of	 a	 modified	 audit	 opinion	 issuance.	 In	 Finland,	 where	reputation	risk	and	 litigation	risk	are	 low,	 individual	auditor	 incentives	 favor	avoiding	client	disputes	 so	 as	 to	 avoid	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 client	 leading	 to	 impaired	 quality	 (Knechel	 and	Vanstraelen	2007;	Hardies	et	al.	2012).	This	study	concentrates	on	the	individual	auditor	level.		The	 individual	 auditor	 can	 however	 react	 to	 economic	 bonding	 in	 different	 ways	 due	 to	tensions	between	professional	intention	to	provide	good	quality	to	the	client	and	willingness	to	impair	quality	to	save	the	client	from	reputation	and	economic	losses.	It	can	be	expected	that	impaired	quality	(or,	compromising)	in	terms	of	traditional	measures	is	likely	to	emerge	only	in	 special	 circumstances	when	 the	client	already	suffers	 from	 financial	difficulties	or	when	a	modified	 audit	 opinion	 can	 lead	 it	 to	 such	 difficulties	 (risky	 clients).	 However,	 in	 normal	circumstances	 it	 can	 be	 expected	 that	 economic	 bonding	may	 lead	 the	 individual	 auditor	 to	provide	higher	quality	to	more	important	clients	when	quality	is	measured	by	overall	quality	measures	such	as	Peer	Review.	This	kind	of	behavior	 is	associated	with	a	strategy	 to	build	a	reputation	 by	 providing	 higher	 than	 expected	 quality	 for	 important	 clients.	 This	 kind	 of	strategy	is	supported	by	empirical	evidence	(Reynolds	and	Francis	2001;	Gaver	and	Paterson	
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2007;	Knechel	et	al.	2013)	showing	that	auditors	are	more	conservative	with	clients	that	are	most	important.		The	clients	 in	our	data	are	all	private	 firms.	The	tendency	to	provide	more	 important	clients	with	better	quality	can	be	stronger	for	clients	who	are	private	firms	than	clients	who	are	public	firms,	since	private	firms	do	not	have	a	broad	shareholder	base	to	which	they	are	accountable	(Knechel	 and	 Vanstraelen	 2007).	 For	 public	 firms,	 the	 differences	 in	 their	 economic	importance	 and	 financial	 reporting	 quality	 are	 smaller	 than	 for	 private	 firms	 (Ball	 and	Shivakumar	 2008).	 Therefore,	 due	 to	 tensions	 between	 providing	 high	 overall	 quality	 and	avoiding	disputes	with	the	client	(compromising),	we	present	the	first	research	hypothesis	in	the	following	general	form:	
H1:	There	is	dependence	between	the	economic	importance	of	client	(private	firm)	and	audit	quality	(Peer	Review)	of	an	individual	engagement	partner.	
 
Auditor	safeguard	Even	though	there	are	some	mitigating	effects	(safeguards)	against	economic	bonding,	they	are	not	empirically	widely	studied.	The	lack	of	research	may	be	due	to	the	sensitive	nature	of	the	issue	as	well	as	a	lack	of	data	(Knechel	et	al.	2013).		Evidence	shows	that	economic	bonding	can	partly	 be	mitigated	 by	 concerns	 about	 an	 auditor’s	 reputation	 (Reynolds	 and	 Francis	 2000;	Weber	 et	 al.	 2008)	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 litigation	 (Krishnan	 and	 Krishnan	 1997;	 Shu	 2000).	Moreover,	 incentive	 for	 individual	partners	 to	accept	 risky	clients	can	be	mitigated	by	profit	sharing	 rules	 (Burrows	 and	 Black	 1998;	 Bedard	 et	 al.	 2008).	 To	 contribute	 to	 this	 scarce	research	we	are	examining	whether	auditor’s	good	economic	position	acts	as	a	safeguard	for	economic	bonding.	This	kind	of	hypothesis	 is	supported	by	Knechel	et	al.	 (2013).	They	show	for	Swedish	data	that	wealthy	audit	partners	with	high	levels	of	annual	compensation	are	likely	to	be	 less	affected	by	the	potential	client	pressure	 implying	greater	auditor	 independence.	 In	their	study,	audit	quality	is	measured	as	propensity	to	issue	a	going-concern	opinion.		Thus,	we	 assume	 that	potential	 economic	bonding	between	 important	 clients	 and	 individual	auditor	 is	 at	 least	 partly	 mitigated	 by	 auditor’s	 good	 economic	 wealth.	 When	 an	 auditor’s	economic	position	is	good,	the	relative	economic	influence	(bond)	of	an	important	client	is	less	than	when	his	or	her	position	is	not	as	good.	In	summary,	based	on	previous	research	and	this	kind	of	reasoning	we	hypothesize	that:		
H2:	The	economic	bonding	is	mitigated	by	good	economic	position	of	an	individual	engagement	partner.	
	
RESEARCH	DESIGN	
Data	sources	The	empirical	data	of	our	research	consist	of	264	auditors’	quality	assurance	reviews	including	two	audit	engagements	(cases)	from	each	auditor	with	complete	data	conducted	in	2010	(107	auditors),	 2011	 (114	 auditors),	 and	 2012	 (43	 auditors).	 Thus,	 the	 number	 of	 observations	(engagements)	in	statistical	analyses	is	equal	to	2·264	=	528.	These	data	are	received	from	The	Finnish	Central	Chamber	of	Commerce	and	 they	 include	all	 the	archival	material	 from	every	review.	The	research	data	are	highly	confidential	and	therefore	not	publicly	available.	For	this	reason,	 any	 detailed	 confidential	 information	 cannot	 be	 published	 in	 this	 study.	 The	 cases	(engagements)	for	peer	review	are	selected	in	the	way	that	one	of	the	engagements	represents	a	 very	 important	 client	 in	 the	 auditor’s	 portfolio	 whereas	 another	 engagement	 is	 randomly	selected	from	the	rest	clients	in	the	portfolio.	In	our	sample,	all	clients	are	private	companies.	These	kinds	of	cases	provide	us	with	an	excellent	opportunity	to	assess	the	influence	of	client’s	importance	on	audit	quality	(H1)	when	comparing	the	two	cases.		
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The	data	are	extracted	from	two	engagement	forms	for	peer	reviewed	audit	engagements.	The	data	 also	 include	 a	 form	where	personal	 quality	 control	 system	 is	 reviewed,	 a	 form	 for	pre-review	 information	gathering	and	a	report	with	 the	result,	both	 in	numeric	and	verbal	 form.	The	 detailed	 questions	 in	 the	 engagement	 forms	 are	 used	 to	 assess	 the	 degree	 of	 the	compliance	 of	 audit	 work	 with	 International	 Auditing	 Standards	 (ISA)	 and	 International	Standard	 on	 Quality	 Control	 1	 (ISQC1)	 separately	 in	 both	 engagements.	 The	 form	 for	 pre-review	 information	 gathering	 is	 the	 main	 source	 for	 information	 about	 individual	 auditor	characteristics.	These	variables	are	used	as	control	variables	in	the	research	model.			In	 addition,	 part	 of	 our	 data	 is	 received	 from	 public	 sources.	 Income	 information	 of	 the	reviewed	 auditors	 is	 received	 from	 a	 Finnish	 private	 tax	 company	 (Veropörssi)	 that	 is	specialized	 in	 gathering	 tax	 data	 for	 their	 customers.	 Public	 tax	 data	 are	 gathered	 for	 all	auditors	 in	 the	 sample	 in	 their	 review	 year	 (2010,	 2011,	 or	 2012).	 Earned	 income	 (annual	salaries)	 and	 unearned	 income	 (capital	 gains)	 figures	 are	 separated	 in	 tax	 data.	 Taxable	unearned	income	is	not	an	exact	measure	of	capital	gains,	since	some	types	of	income	are	not	taxable.	It	was	not	possible	to	get	information	about	the	taxable	wealth	of	auditors	because	it	is	not	public	 information	 in	Finland	 (cf.	Knechel	et	al.	2013).	These	data	of	 taxable	earned	and	unearned	 income	 are	 used	 in	 assess	 the	mitigation	 effect	 of	 economic	 position	 on	 economic	bond	(H2).			
Variables	The	audit	quality	is	reflected	by	four	peer	review	variables.	The	measurement	of	quality	is	not	straightforward	because	the	engagement	forms	are	not	identical	in	each	year	due	to	changes	in	detailed	questions.	In	all,	the	forms	from	three	years	contained	155	detailed	review	questions	and	118	of	them	(76.1%)	are	comparable	over	years	and	included	in	the	analysis.	The	number	of	 responded	 questions	 is	 not	 identical	 for	 each	 engagement,	 since	 some	 questions	 are	 not	appropriate	for	every	case.	The	questions	are	classified	in	four	classes	according	to	the	stage	of	audit	 process	 that	 the	 standards	 are	 associated	 with:	 1)	 planning	 audit	 engagement	 (9	questions);	2)	analytical	procedure	1	(31	questions);	3)	analytical	procedure	2	(48	questions);	and	 4)	 conclusions	 and	 reporting	 (30	 questions).	 Classes	 of	 analytical	 procedures	 2	 and	conclusions	 and	 reporting	 respectively	 include	 questions	 about	 discretionary	 accruals	(earnings	management,	EM)	and	modified	audit	 (e.g.,	 going	 concern,	GC)	opinions	which	are	main	measures	 of	 audit	 quality	 used	 in	 prior	 studies.	 For	 each	 class,	 a	 summary	measure	 is	constructed	 reflecting	 the	 degree	 of	 compliance	 (%)	with	 standards	 (yes	 or	 no).	 Finally,	 an	overall	 summary	 measure	 is	 calculated	 as	 the	 degree	 of	 compliance	 with	 all	 118	 standard	questions.		The	 variables	 reflecting	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 compliance	 with	 standards	 between	 bigger	(more	important)	and	smaller	(less	important)	clients	are	used	as	dependent	variables	in	our	research	models	 to	 test	 hypotheses	H1	 and	H2.	 The	 size	 (economic	 importance)	 of	 clients	 is	measured	 by	 annual	 turnover.	 The	 research	 models	 also	 include	 a	 set	 of	 independent	 and	control	 variables.	 The	 economic	 position	 of	 the	 auditor	 to	 test	 H2	 is	 measured	 by	 two	independent	variables	in	a	logarithmic	form:	total	annual	income	and	unearned	annual	income	(capital	 gains).	 In	 this	 analysis,	 total	 annual	 income	measures	 total	 income	 available	 to	 the	auditor	whereas	unearned	income	is	proxy	for	taxable	wealth	that	is	not	publicly	available.		The	research	models	also	include	a	set	of	control	variables	(cf.	Knechel	et	al.	2012;	Knechel	et	al.	2013).	Most	control	variables	deal	with	the	characteristics	of	the	author	and	his	or	her	work.	However,	 the	 results	 are	 firstly	 controlled	 for	 the	 bigger	 client’s	 (logarithmic)	 turnover	 to	reflect	its	importance.	The	auditor’s	characteristics	and	work	are	measured	by	eight	variables.	
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Four	of	these	control	variables	are	dummy	variables:	full-time	auditor	(0	=	part-time,	1	=	full	time);	gender	(0	=	female;	1	=	male);	CPA	exam	(0	=	HTM,	1	=	KHT);	and	company	form	(0	=	private,	1	=	 company).	The	 rest	of	 the	control	variables	 reflect	 the	auditor’s	age,	 experience,	and	work	load;	age	in	years;	age	of	CPA	exam;	(logarithmic)	number	of	annual	engagements;	and	number	of	annual	hours	of	audit	work.		
Statistical	methods	The	 research	 data	 provides	 us	 an	 excellent	 opportunity	 to	 test	 the	 hypotheses	 using	 simple	statistical	methods.	For	each	auditor	peer	review	results	from	264	bigger	(important)	and	264	smaller	(random)	engagement	clients	are	available.	First,	we	analyze	the	pairwise	differences	in	the	audit	quality	measures	between	big	and	small	clients	using	the	paired	t	test.	In	this	case,	the	results	are	controlled	for	other	variables	than	the	size	of	client,	since	the	engagements	of	the	big	and	small	clients	are	conducted	by	the	same	auditor	in	the	same	year.	If	the	difference	in	the	audit	quality	between	big	and	small	clients	is	positive	and	statistically	significant,	we	get	general	evidence	supporting	H1.		The	 results	 of	 paired	 t	 test	 do	 not	 however	 show	whether	 the	 potential	 difference	 in	 audit	quality	 between	 the	 clients	 is	 depending	 on	 the	 auditor’s	 economic	 position,	 the	 big	 client’s	size,	or	the	auditor’s	characteristics	and	work.	Therefore,	we	use	the	regression	analysis	in	two	different	ways	to	assess	this	dependence.	First,	we	estimate	the	following	regression	equations	explaining	 overall	 summary	 quality	 (compliance	 with	 standards)	 separately	 for	 the	 big	 and	small	clients:		 SCi(j)	=	a	+	b1X1i	+	….	+	b11X11i	+	e,	 	 	 	 (1)		where	
SCi(k)	=	Overall	summary	compliance	(j	=	big	client,	small	client)	
a	=	constant	
bj	=	coefficients	(j	=	1,	2,	…,	11)	
X1i	=	Unearned	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	
X2i	=	Total	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	
X3i	=	Client	turnover	(thousands	of	Euro),	logarithm	
X4i	=	Full-time	auditor	(0	=	part-time,	1	=	full-time)	
X5i	=	Gender	of	auditor	(0	=	female,	1	=	male)	
X6i	=	CPA	exam	of	auditor	(0	=	HTM,	1	=	KHT)	
X7i	=	Company	form	of	auditor	(0	=	private,	1	=	company)	
X8i	=	Age	of	auditor	X9i	=	Age	of	CPA	exam	
X10i	=	Number	of	annual	engagements,	logarithm	
X11i	=	Number	of	annual	hours	in	audit	work	
ei	=	residual	
i	=	auditor	(i	=	1,	2,	…	,	264)		If	 the	 auditors	 conduct	 the	 audit	 engagements	 of	 the	 big	 and	 small	 clients	 in	 the	 same	way	(with	 the	 same	 compliance	 with	 standards),	 the	 regression	 equations	 in	 (1)	 give	 identical	results	(quality	determination	functions)	for	the	big	and	small	clients.	Moreover,	the	marginal	effect	of	client	size	(logarithmic	turnover)	X3i	(b3i)	should	be	insignificant.	This	comparison	of	estimation	results	between	the	two	clients	also	serves	as	a	robustness	test	for	explaining	audit	quality.		Secondly,	we	estimate	the	following	regression	equations	explaining	the	potential	difference	in	
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the	 audit	 quality	 (compliance	 with	 standards)	 between	 the	 big	 client	 and	 the	 small	 client	separately	for	the	five	quality	measures	(all	standards	and	four	classes	of	standards):		
DSCi(j)	=	a	+	b1X1i	+	….	+	b11X11i	+	e,	 	 	 	 (2)		where	the	variables	are	the	same	as	for	(1)	except	for	the	following:	
DSCi(j)	 =	 Difference	 in	 compliance	 with	 standards	 (j	 =	 all	 standards,	 planning	 audit	engagement,	analytical	procedures	1,	analytical	procedures	2,	conclusions	and	reporting)	
X3i	=	Big	client	turnover	(thousands	of	Euro),	logarithm		In	equation	(2)	the	focus	is	set	on	the	coefficients	of	X1i,	X2i,	and	X3i.	If	the	coefficient	of	X3i	(b3i)	is	 statistically	 significant,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 big	 client	 affects	 the	 difference	 in	 audit	 quality	between	the	big	client	and	the	small	client	supporting	H1.	The	coefficients	of	X1i	and	X2i	(b1i	and	
b2i)	reflect	the	auditor’s	economic	position	of	the	quality	difference	allowing	us	to	test	H2.	To	support	 H2,	 they	 should	 be	 statistically	 significant	 and	 have	 an	 opposite	 sign	 from	 the	coefficient	of	X3i	(b3i)	to	indicate	a	mitigating	effect.			
EMPIRICAL	RESULTS	
Comparative	analysis	Table	 1	 shows	descriptive	 statistics	 for	 the	 client	 size	 and	 the	measures	 of	 compliance	with	audit	standards.	The	median	turnover	of	the	big	client	is	about	4.0	million	Euros	whereas	it	is	only	1.2	million	Euros	for	the	small	client.	Both	size	measures	(turnover	and	total	assets)	show	a	high	skewness	and	kurtosis.	The	statistics	of	 the	compliance	measures	 indicate	a	very	high	audit	quality	for	Finnish	auditors.	For	both	groups	of	clients	the	median	of	compliance	with	all	standards	is	over	85%.	The	compliance	with	standards	is	exceptionally	high	in	conclusions	and	reporting	 for	both	groups.	The	compliance	with	 standards	 is	 lowest	 in	analytical	procedures	being	on	average	higher	for	big	clients.	For	big	and	small	clients	the	quality	measures	show	a	low	skewness	and	kurtosis.																						
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Table	1.	Descriptive	statistics	of	compliance	measures	for	big	and	small	audit	clients	(N=264).	
Variable	 Mean	 Median	 Standard	Deviation	 Skewness	 Kurtosis	1.	Big	client	 	 	 	 	 	Client	turnover	(thousands	of	Euro)	 8641,09	 3997,00	 15959,85	 6,31	 53,42	Client	total	assets	(thousands	of	Euro)	 4769,57	 2130,00	 8895,62	 5,79	 44,14	Compliance	(%)	with	all	standards	 77,92	 85,81	 22,08	 -1,30	 1,01	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	planning	audit	engagement	 81,20	 91,67	 23,70	 -1,37	 0,93	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	analytical	procedures	1	 71,02	 79,17	 26,64	 -0,85	 -0,39	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	analytical	procedures	2	 77,22	 83,33	 22,73	 -1,03	 0,26	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	conclusions	and	reporting	 88,31	 94,74	 18,69	 -2,37	 5,30	2.	Small	client	 	 	 	 	 	Client	turnover	(thousands	of	Euro)	 2521,14	 1246,50	 3700,36	 3,69	 17,31	Client	total	assets	(thousands	of	Euro)	 2640,43	 940,00	 9049,33	 11,62	 156,56	Compliance	(%)	with	all	standards	 78,15	 85,31	 20,88	 -1,19	 0,72	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	planning	audit	engagement	 81,04	 91,67	 24,28	 -1,30	 0,53	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	analytical	procedures	1	 70,14	 77,78	 26,36	 -0,79	 -0,34	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	analytical	procedures	2	 75,80	 80,38	 22,22	 -0,88	 -0,01	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	conclusions	and	reporting	 88,75	 95,00	 17,76	 -2,23	 4,69		 	 	 	 	 	Table	2	shows	 the	paired	 t-tests	 for	 the	variables. The	pairwise	differences	 in	client	 size	are	statistically	 significant.	 The	 significance	 (p-value)	 of	 the	 test	 statistic	 is	 lower	 for	 client	turnover	 than	 for	 total	 assets	 as	 a	measure	 of	 size.	 The	 pairwise	 differences	 in	 compliance	measures	between	big	and	small	clients	are	negligible	indicating	high	independence	in	auditing	from	this	point	of	view.	The	most	notable	difference	is	found	in	the	compliance	with	analytical	procedures	(part	2)	that	is	significant	at	p-value	10%	(two-way	significance).	The	difference	is	positive	referring	to	higher	compliance	with	standards	in	big	client	engagements.																			
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Table	2.	Paired	differences	of	compliance	measures	between	big	and	small	audit	clients	of	
auditors	(N=264).		 Paired	Differences	 	 	 	Variable	 Mean	 Standard	Deviation	 Standard	 Error	Mean	 t	statistic	 p-value#	Client	turnover	(thousands	of	Euro)	 6119,95	 15056,94	 926,69	 6,60	 0,0000	Client	total	assets	(thousands	of	Euro)	 2134,19	 12267,72	 769,75	 2,77	 0,0060	Compliance	(%)	with	all	standards	 -0,23	 10,93	 0,67	 -0,34	 0,7320	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	planning	audit	engagement	 0,28	 17,83	 1,13	 0,25	 0,8070	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	analytical	procedures	1	 0,94	 15,75	 0,99	 0,96	 0,3410	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	analytical	procedures	2	 1,81	 15,83	 0,99	 1,83	 0,0690	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	conclusions	and	reporting	 -0,48	 10,64	 0,66	 -0,73	 0,4680	Note:	 	 	 	 	 	#	=	2-tailed	probability	 	 	 	 	 		Appendix	1	presents	the	statistical	distributions	(percentiles)	of	the	differences	in	compliance	measures	 between	 big	 and	 small	 clients.	 These	 distributions	 again	 emphasize	 the	 small	differences	found	in	audit	quality.	 	The	distributions	are	all	symmetric	around	zero	obviously	referring	 to	 a	 random	nature	 of	 difference.	 There	 is	 not	 found	 any	 identifiable	 tendency	 for	concentration	 on	 positive	 or	 negative	 side	 of	 the	 distributions.	 	 For	 each	 distribution,	 the	median	 difference	 is	 zero.	 The	 auditors	 show	 highest	 consistency	 in	 planning	 audit	engagement	and	in	conclusions	and	reporting	where	about	40%	of	the	auditors	achieve	exactly	the	 same	 compliance	 for	 big	 and	 small	 clients.	 Thus,	 in	 summary,	 the	 descriptive	 statistical	results	 do	 not	 give	 empirical	 support	 for	 H1.	 Finnish	 auditors	 are	 likely	 to	 conduct	 audit	engagements	with	very	comparable	quality	for	big	and	small	clients.		
Regression	results	Table	3	shows	descriptive	statistics	for	the	variables	used	in	the	regression	equations	(1)	and	(2)	 as	 dependent	 and	 independent	 variables.	 The	 variables	 reflecting	 the	 difference	 in	compliance	show	only	a	low	skewness	in	their	distributions	due	to	a	high	symmetry.	However,	they	show	higher	kurtosis	due	to	the	concentration	of	differences	around	zero	(indicating	high	consistency	 in	 audit	 quality).	 The	 distributions	 of	 the	 independent	 variables	 are	 also	 only	slightly	 skewed	 for	 the	 sake	of	 logarithmic	 transformations.	 In	general,	 the	kurtosis	of	 these	distributions	is	low	except	for	the	(logarithmic)	unearned	annual	income.	The	high	kurtosis	in	this	case	 is	due	 to	 that	about	30%	of	 the	auditors	have	not	capital	gains	at	all.	This	 fact	also	increases	the	(absolute)	skewness	of	the	distribution.	The	descriptive	statistics	show	that	51%	of	the	auditors	are	full-time	auditors,	and	that	75%	of	them	are	male.	In	addition,	the	average	age	of	the	sample	auditors	is	quite	high	(58	years)	and	they	have	passed	their	CPA	more	than	twenty	years	ago.			Appendix	2	shows	that	the	correlations	between	the	independent	variables	are	generally	very	low.	 The	 highest	 correlation	 is	 found	 between	 the	 (logarithmic)	 numbers	 of	 annual	engagements	and	annual	hours	in	audit	work	(0.77).	These	variables	referring	to	the	amount	of	auditor’s	work	are	also	positively	correlated	with	full-time	auditor	dummy	(0.48	and	0.56)	and	the	bigger	client	turnover	(0.41	and	0.44).	These	correlations	are	too	low	to	lead	any	serious	
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multicollinearity.	For	all	regression	analyses,	the	variance	inflation	factors	(VIF)	are	less	than	3.	Appendix	2	also	shows	that	 the	correlations	between	the	dependent	compliance	measures	and	 the	 independent	 variables	 are	 very	 low.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 the	 strength	 of	dependence	 in	 the	 regression	 equations	 explaining	 overall	 compliance	with	 standards	 or	 its	parts	is	also	weak.			
Table	3.	Descriptive	statistics	of	the	dependent	and	independent	variables	(N=264).	
Variable	 Mean	 Median	 Standard	Deviation	 Skewness	 Kurtosis	1.	Difference	in	variable	(dependent	variable)	 	 	 	 	 	Compliance	(%)	with	all	standards	 -0,23	 0,00	 10,93	 0,15	 7,03	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	planning	audit	engagement	 0,28	 0,00	 17,83	 0,50	 4,82	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	analytical	procedures	1	 0,94	 0,00	 15,75	 0,13	 3,33	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	analytical	procedures	2	 1,81	 0,00	 15,83	 0,21	 1,77	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	conclusions	and	reporting	 -0,48	 0,00	 10,64	 -0,59	 9,81	2.	Independent	variable	 	 	 	 	 	Unearned	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 5,42	 7,16	 4,23	 -0,31	 -1,58	Total	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 10,91	 10,98	 0,79	 -3,79	 33,19	Bigger	client	turnover	(thousands	of	Euro),	logarithm	 8,35	 8,29	 1,15	 0,18	 0,20	Full-time	auditor	(0	=	part-time,	1	=	full-time)	 0,51	 1,00	 0,50	 -0,05	 -2,01	Gender	of	auditor	(0	=	female,	1	=	male)	 0,75	 1,00	 0,44	 -1,14	 -0,71	CPA	exam	of	auditor	(0	=	HTM,	1	=	KHT)	 0,22	 0,00	 0,41	 1,39	 -0,07	Company	form	of	auditor	(0	=	private,	1	=	company)	 0,13	 0,00	 0,34	 2,18	 2,77	Age	of	auditor	 57,56	 59,00	 7,77	 -0,92	 0,41	Age	of	CPA	exam	 21,42	 22,00	 8,90	 -0,26	 -0,68	Number	of	annual	engagements,	logarithm	 4,36	 4,46	 1,02	 -0,34	 0,15	Number	of	annual	hours	in	audit	work	 578,78	 428,00	 452,22	 1,20	 1,15		Table	4	presents	 the	estimation	results	of	 regression	equation	(1)	separately	 for	 the	big	and	small	 client.	 In	 general,	 the	 association	 between	 the	 dependent	 variable	 (overall	 summary	compliance	with	standards)	and	the	independent	variables	is	not	strong	for	either	model.	This	indicates	 that	 it	 is	not	easy	 to	explain	 statistically	audit	quality	 in	 terms	of	peer	 review.	The	average	 differences	 in	 quality	 between	 auditors	 are	 quite	 small	 and	 random.	 There	 are	however	a	couple	of	statistically	significant	similarities	in	the	estimated	models.	First,	the	total	annual	 income	 has	 a	 positive	 relationship	 with	 quality	 for	 both	 big	 and	 small	 clients.	 It	indicates	 that	 the	 auditor’s	 income	 is	 correlated	 with	 competence	 to	 meet	 standards	 in	engagements.	Second,	full-time	auditors	show	a	higher	compliance	with	standards	irrespective	of	client’s	size.	Third,	the	older	of	CPA	exam,	the	lower	is	the	compliance	in	both	big	and	small	cases.	Thus,	those	auditors	who	have	recently	passed	CPA	exam	meet	the	standards	better	than	other	auditors.			The	 client’s	 size	 and	 the	 auditor’s	 unearned	 income	 have	 a	 statistically	 insignificant	relationship	with	 compliance	 for	both	models.	Thus,	 the	 results	of	quality	determination	are	quite	 robust	 leading	 in	 general	 to	 similar	 functions	 for	 the	 compliance	 with	 standards	 in	engagements	 of	 big	 and	 small	 clients.	 However,	 the	 signs	 of	 the	 (statistically	 insignificant)	coefficients	of	the	client’s	size	and	the	auditor’s	unearned	income	are	opposite	for	small	client	and	 big	 client	 models.	 This	 finding	 raises	 an	 expectation	 that	 in	 spite	 of	 insignificant	
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coefficients	these	variables	may	play	some	roles	when	explaining	the	difference	in	audit	quality	between	the	big	and	small	clients.			
Table	4.	Regression	models	for	compliance	(%)	with	all	standards	(dependent	variable)	
(N=264).		 Big	client:	 	 Small	client:	 	Independent	variable	 Coefficient	 t	statistic	 p-value#	 Coefficient	 t	statistic	 p-value#	Constant	 21,751	 0,924	 0,356	 46,837	 2,123	 0,035	Unearned	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 -0,351	 -1,055	 0,293	 0,000	 0,001	 0,999	Total	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 4,649	 2,603	 0,010	 3,049	 1,793	 0,074	Client	(big/small)	turnover	(thousands	of	Euro),	logarithm	 0,832	 0,612	 0,541	 -0,900	 -0,832	 0,406	Full-time	auditor	(0	=	part-time,	1	=	full-time)	 6,482	 1,857	 0,064	 5,145	 1,556	 0,121	Gender	of	auditor	(0	=	female,	1	=	male)	 1,772	 0,552	 0,581	 1,938	 0,634	 0,527	CPA	exam	of	auditor	(0	=	HTM,	1	=	KHT)	 -0,271	 -0,075	 0,941	 -1,578	 -0,460	 0,646	Company	form	of	auditor	(0	=	private,	1	=	company)	 -0,620	 -0,146	 0,884	 -0,029	 -0,007	 0,994	Age	of	auditor	 0,049	 0,191	 0,849	 -0,011	 -0,046	 0,964	Age	of	CPA	exam	 -0,424	 -1,900	 0,059	 -0,392	 -1,835	 0,068	Number	of	annual	engagements,	logarithm	 0,045	 0,021	 0,984	 2,008	 0,934	 0,351	Number	of	annual	hours	in	audit	work	 0,003	 0,673	 0,502	 0,002	 0,355	 0,723	Coefficient	of	determination	(R-Square)	(adjusted)	 0,089	 (0,049)	 	 0,072	 (0,032)	 	F	statistic	(significance)	 2,233	 (0,013)	 	 1,787	 (0,057)	 	Note:	 	 	 	 	 	 	#	=	2-tailed	probability	 	 	 	 	 	 		Table	5	shows	the	regression	results	for	equation	(2)	explaining	the	difference	in	compliance	with	 standards	 between	 big	 and	 small	 clients.	 The	 strength	 of	 dependence	 between	 the	difference	and	the	independent	variables	(predictors)	is	weak	which	was	expected	due	to	the	random	nature	of	difference	distributions.	The	 first	part	 of	 the	 table	 shows	 the	 results	 for	 a	model	 estimated	 without	 control	 variables.	 The	 difference	 in	 compliance	 is	 significantly	affected	 by	 big	 client	 turnover	 (positively)	 and	 unearned	 annual	 income	 (negatively).	 The	effect	of	annual	 income	 is	positive	but	statistically	 insignificant.	The	second	part	of	 the	 table	shows	the	results	for	the	full	model.	The	robustness	of	the	results	is	emphasized	by	the	finding	that	the	coefficients	of	the	three	main	variables	are	only	slightly	changed	but	the	coefficient	of	annual	income	is	now	significant.	The	control	variables	do	not	have	any	significant	effect	on	the	difference	in	compliance	with	standards.	In	a	robustness	test,	client	turnover	was	replaced	by	client	total	assets.	However,	it	had	only	a	negligible	effect	on	results.		Thus,	 although	 the	 differences	 in	 compliance	 between	 big	 and	 small	 clients	 are	 small	 and	largely	 random,	 our	 findings	 give	 empirical	 support	 to	 H1	 and	 H2.	 First,	 there	 is	 a	 positive	dependence	between	difference	of	compliance	and	 the	big	client’s	 turnover.	The	bigger	 (big)	client,	 the	higher	 is	 the	compliance	for	the	big	client	 in	relation	to	that	 for	the	smaller	client.	Thus,	 although	 the	 effect	 is	 weak,	 the	 findings	 support	 H1	 and	 the	 conclusion	 that	 Finnish	auditors	to	some	degree	trust	a	strategy	to	build	a	reputation	by	providing	higher	quality	for	important	clients	(Reynolds	and	Francis	2001;	Gaver	and	Paterson,	2007;	Knechel	et	al.	2013).	However,	 the	 findings	 show	 that	 annual	 income	 does	 not	 act	 as	 a	 safeguard	 against	 this	
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strategy,	 since	 its	 effect	 on	 the	 difference	 is	 also	 positive.	 Hence,	 auditors	with	 high	 annual	income	tend	to	provide	for	the	big	client	higher	quality	than	for	the	small	client.	This	positive	relation	between	income	and	difference	obviously	contradicts	with	H2.		
Table	5.	Regression	models	for	the	difference	in	compliance	(%)	with	all	standards	between	big	
and	small	clients	(N=264).	
	 Without	control	variables:	 With	 control	variables:	 	Independent	variable	 Coefficient	 t	statistic	 p-value#	 Coefficient	 t	statistic	 p-value#	Constant	 -23,288	 -2,323	 0,021	 -23,783	 -2,011	 0,045	Unearned	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 -0,353	 -2,197	 0,029	 -0,335	 -1,999	 0,047	Total	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 1,134	 1,316	 0,189	 1,509	 1,681	 0,094	Big	client	turnover	(thousands	of	Euro),	logarithm	 1,508	 2,599	 0,010	 1,508	 2,204	 0,028	Full-time	auditor	(0	=	part-time,	1	=	full-time)	 		 		 		 1,238	 0,706	 0,481	Gender	of	auditor	(0	=	female,	1	=	male)	 		 		 		 -0,149	 -0,092	 0,926	CPA	exam	of	auditor	(0	=	HTM,	1	=	KHT)	 		 		 		 1,342	 0,733	 0,464	Company	form	of	auditor	(0	=	private,	1	=	company)	 		 		 		 -0,540	 -0,254	 0,800	Age	of	auditor	 		 		 		 0,039	 0,303	 0,762	Age	of	CPA	exam	 		 		 		 -0,018	 -0,165	 0,869	Number	of	annual	engagements,	logarithm	 		 		 		 -1,625	 -1,477	 0,141	Number	of	annual	hours	in	audit	work	 		 		 		 0,001	 0,545	 0,586	Coefficient	of	determination	(R-Square)	(adjusted)	 0,045	 (0,034)	 	 0,060	 (0,019)	 	F	statistic	(significance)	 4,117	 (0,007)	 	 1,465	 (0,145)	 	Note:	 	 	 	 	 	 	#	=	2-tailed	probability	 	 	 	 	 	 		The	 results	 however	 show	 that	 the	 relation	 between	 unearned	 annual	 income	 and	 the	difference	 in	 compliance	 is	 negative	 and	 statistically	 significant.	 Since	 capital	 gains	 are	 here	used	as	a	proxy	of	wealth,	this	finding	is	consistent	with	the	results	got	by	Knechel	et	al.	(2013)	for	distressed	Swedish	firms.	Hence,	empirical	evidence	supports	H2	in	that	high	capital	gains	(wealth)	diminish	the	difference	in	compliance	between	the	big	and	small	clients.	Since	capital	gains	are	included	in	total	annual	income,	the	effect	is	not	straightforward	but	also	dependent	on	the	effect	of	total	income.	Because	of	the	logarithmic	transformation,	the	marginal	effect	of	unearned	income	(X1i)	on	the	difference	in	compliance	(DSCi)	is	as	follows:		
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i > 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4)		which	shows	that	in	this	case	the	percent	of	capital	gains	in	total	income	should	be	more	than	22.2%	(-0.335/1.509)	to	make	the	effect	negative.	Thus,	although	supporting	H2,	the	auditor’s	wealth	in	terms	of	capital	gains	must	be	quite	high	to	act	as	a	safeguard	against	economic	bond.	In	 the	 present	 sample,	 this	 condition	 holds	 for	 about	 17-18%	of	 the	 auditors	 getting	 capital	
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gains	more	than	22.2%	of	total	income.			The	regression	coefficients	b1,	b2,	and	b3	in	Table	5	for	capital	gains,	total	income,	and	big	client	turnover	 respectively	 can	 be	 interpreted	 analyzing	 the	 differences	 of	 the	 respective	coefficients	 between	 regression	 equations	 (1)	 estimated	 separately	 for	 big	 and	 small	 clients	using	the	same	independent	variables	as	in	(2).	For	the	big	client,	the	regression	equation	is	the	same	as	in	Table	4.	However,	for	the	small	client,	the	regression	equation	must	be	re-estimated	using	 the	 big	 client	 turnover	 instead	 of	 its	 own	 turnover	 as	 an	 independent	 variable.	 The	resulted	regression	equation	 is	presented	 in	Appendix	3.	 	Using	 the	estimated	coefficients	 in	Table	4	and	Appendix	3,	 the	differences	of	 the	coefficients	of	capital	gains	(X1i),	 total	 income	(X2i),	and	big	client	turnover	(X3i)	between	the	big	and	small	client	models	are	as	follows:		 	 Big	clients	model	 Small	clients	model	 	Variable	 Coefficient	 Coefficient	 Difference	
X1i	 -0,351	 -0,017	 -0,334	
X2i	 4,649	 3,140	 1,509	
X3i	 0,832	 -0,675	 1,507		The	 differences	 of	 the	 coefficients	 in	 the	 fourth	 column	 almost	 exactly	 correspond	 to	 the	coefficients	 estimated	 in	 the	 model	 for	 the	 difference	 in	 compliance	 with	 audit	 standards	(Table	 5).	 The	 coefficients	 show	 that	 the	 strong	 effect	 of	 big	 client	 turnover	 (X3i)	 on	 the	difference	 in	 compliance	 is	 originated	 from	 its	 positive	 effect	 on	 big	 client’s	 quality	 and	 its	negative	effect	on	 the	small	client’s	quality.	Thus,	auditors	 tend	to	provide	higher	quality	 for	big	 clients	 and	 lower	 quality	 for	 small	 clients;	 the	 higher	 is	 big	 client	 turnover.	 In	 addition,	auditors	with	higher	 total	 income	(X2i)	 tend	 to	provide	higher	quality	 for	both	big	and	small	clients	 but	 the	 tendency	 is	 clearly	 stronger	 for	 big	 clients	 increasing	 the	 difference	 in	compliance	 between	 these	 clients.	 Finally,	 capital	 gains	 (X1i)	 act	 as	 an	 effective	 safeguard	against	this	bonding	for	big	clients	but	not	for	small	clients.		
Partial	results	Table	6	presents	the	estimated	regression	equations	for	equation	(2)	explaining	the	difference	in	 compliance	with	 standards	 between	 big	 and	 small	 clients	 separately	 for	 all	 four	 parts	 of	compliance	with	standards.	The	results	show	that	 the	differences	 in	audit	quality	are	 largely	random	 and	 only	 for	 analytical	 procedures	 2	 the	 regression	 is	 statistically	 marginally	significant	 (p-value	 0.06).	 For	 each	 part	 of	 compliance,	 the	 coefficients	 of	 (logarithmic)	unearned	income	(capital	gains)	are	negative	although	being	insignificant	in	the	2-tailed	test.	However,	for	analytical	procedures	2	this	coefficient	is	significant	in	the	1-tailed	test	at	p-level	<	 0.10	 reflecting	 a	 potential	 safeguarding	 effect	 (1-tailed	 p-value	 0.09).	 The	 coefficients	 of	(logarithmic)	 total	 annual	 income	 are	 not	 consistent	 over	 the	 parts	 of	 compliance	 being	negative	 for	 two	 parts	 and	 positive	 for	 two	 parts	 of	 compliance.	 The	 only	 statistically	significant	(positive)	coefficient	of	this	variable	at	p-level	<	0.10	is	got	for	the	difference	in	the	compliance	for	conclusions	and	reporting	(p-value	0.08).							
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Table	6.	Regression	models	for	the	difference	in	different	compliance	measures	between	big	and	
small	clients	(N=264).		 Difference	in	compliance	with	audit	standards	in:	 	 	 	
	
Planning	 audit	engagement	 Analytical	procedures	1	 Analyticalprocedures	2	 Conclusions	and	reporting	
Independent	variable	 Coefficient	 p-value#	 Coefficient	 p-value#	 Coefficient	 p-value#	 Coefficient	 p-value#	Constant	 21,140	 0,405	 -18,329	 0,297	 -7,309	 0,671	 -3,272	 0,777	Unearned	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 -0,297	 0,306	 -0,130	 0,604	 -0,329	 0,181	 -0,094	 0,567	Total	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 -1,612	 0,405	 1,486	 0,268	 -0,309	 0,814	 1,544	 0,080	Big	client	turnover	(thousands	of	Euro),	logarithm	 1,575	 0,189	 1,225	 0,235	 2,694	 0,008	 -0,362	 0,588	Full-time	auditor	(0	=	part-time,	1	=	full-time)	 0,476	 0,874	 2,173	 0,407	 2,406	 0,354	 -1,131	 0,513	Gender	of	auditor	(0	=	female,	1	=	male)	 4,459	 0,114	 0,592	 0,806	 -3,105	 0,194	 -2,068	 0,191	CPA	exam	of	auditor	(0	=	HTM,	1	=	KHT)	 0,357	 0,907	 0,104	 0,969	 3,306	 0,215	 0,899	 0,616	Company	form	of	auditor	(0	=	private,	1	=	company)	 -0,956	 0,786	 -3,479	 0,274	 1,535	 0,619	 0,773	 0,710	Age	of	auditor	 -0,235	 0,287	 -0,031	 0,874	 -0,004	 0,983	 -0,055	 0,664	Age	of	CPA	exam	 0,238	 0,212	 0,108	 0,513	 0,063	 0,703	 -0,110	 0,323	Number	of	annual	engagements,	logarithm	 -2,584	 0,169	 -2,136	 0,199	 -1,851	 0,259	 -1,431	 0,184	Number	of	annual	hours	in	audit	work	 0,002	 0,570	 0,002	 0,612	 -0,002	 0,599	 0,005	 0,036	Coefficient	of	determination	(R-Square)	(adjusted)	 0,048	 (0,004)	 0,029	 -(0,015)	 0,074	 (0,032)	 0,057	 (0,015)	F	statistic	(significance)	 1,08	 (0,378)	 0,652	 (0,782)	 1,766	 (0,060)	 1,366	 (0,190)	Note:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	#	=	2-tailed	probability	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		There	 are	 only	 two	 additional	 statistically	 significant	 coefficients	 in	 the	models	 for	 the	 four	parts	 of	 compliance.	 Firstly,	 a	 significant	 coefficient	 is	 obtained	 for	 the	 difference	 in	 the	compliance	of	analytical	procedures	2.	For	this	part	of	compliance,	the	coefficient	of	big	client	turnover	 is	 positive	 and	 statistically	 very	 significant	 (p-value	 0.008).	 This	 strong	 client	 size	effect	 is	 expected	 due	 to	 the	 significant	 difference	 found	 in	 this	 part	 between	 big	 and	 small	clients	 (Table	 2).	 Secondly,	 for	 the	 compliance	 of	 conclusions	 and	 reporting	 the	 number	 of	annual	hours	in	audit	work	has	a	significant	positive	effect	(p-value	0.036).	This	result	implies	that	 the	 amount	 of	 practical	 audit	 work	 improves	 the	 quality	 of	 audit	 in	 conclusions	 and	reporting.	 The	 coefficient	 shows	 that	 an	 increase	 of	 1000	 hours	 in	 audit	 work	 increases	compliance	with	standards	in	this	part	by	5	percent	units.			In	 summary,	 the	 partial	 regression	 analyses	 do	 not	 give	 consistent	 overall	 support	 to	 the	research	hypotheses.	However,	they	obviously	give	partial	support.	It	seems	that	auditors	with	higher	 annual	 income	 are	 likely	 to	 make	 better	 quality	 for	 big	 clients	 in	 conclusions	 and	reporting	conforming	to	H2.	It	also	seems	that	auditors	are	more	likely	to	make	better	quality	to	 big	 clients	 in	 analytical	 procedures	 2	 supporting	 H1.	 For	 these	 procedures	 the	 total	 and	capital	 income	measures	have	a	negative	 (2-tailed	 insignificant)	 coefficient	only	giving	weak	
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support	for	safeguarding	(H2).	The	findings	imply	that	economic	bonding	and	safeguarding	are	so	weakly	associated	with	auditing	that	they	are	systematically	identifiable	only	at	the	level	of	overall	quality	as	a	sum	of	all	parts	of	compliance.	This	kind	of	general	conclusion	is	supported	by	 correlations	 between	 the	 compliance	 measures	 (Appendix	 2).	 The	 compliance	 with	 all	standards	is	strongly	correlated	with	all	parts	of	compliance	but	the	correlations	between	the	parts	are	however	much	lower	reflecting	their	heterogeneity.			
SUMMARY	AND	CONCLUSIONS	The	 first	 objective	 of	 this	 study	 was	 to	 examine	 whether	 the	 economic	 bond	 between	 an	individual	engagement	partner	and	his	or	her	client	threatens	auditor	independence	and	thus	audit	quality	 (H1).	The	second	objective	was	 to	 investigate	whether	auditor’s	good	economic	position	acts	as	a	 safeguard	mitigating	at	 least	partly	 the	effects	of	 this	economic	bond	 (H2).	The	self-interest	threats	are	due	to	such	reasons	as	dependence	on	total	fees	from	an	assurance	client,	concern	about	the	possibility	of	losing	the	engagement,	or	contingent	fees.	Many	studies	have	 found	 auditor	 independence	 impairment	 due	 to	 economic	 bond	 associated	with	 lower	quality	 (Frankel	 et	 al.	 2002;	 Knechel	 et	 al.	 2013).	 However,	 some	 studies	 have	 not	 found	evidence	for	this	association	(DeFond	et	al.	2002;	Lennox	1999;	Hardies	et	al.	2012).	There	is	lack	of	research	on	safeguarding	in	this	situation.	However,	Knechel	et	al.	(2013)	showed	that	for	distressed	firms	the	client’s	economic	importance	increased	and	the	auditor’s	wealth	(as	a	safeguard)	 decreased	 the	 auditor’s	 propensity	 to	 give	 a	 modified	 (going	 concern)	 audit	opinion.		This	 study	makes	 several	 contributions	 to	 the	 existing	 research.	 First,	 we	 contribute	 to	 the	scarce	literature	that	examines	audit	quality	at	individual	engagement	level	(Chen	et	al.	2010;	Francis	and	Yu	2009;	Hardies	et	al.	2012;	Knechel	et	al.	2013).	Second,	we	extend	the	study	by	Hardies	et	al.	(2012)	taking	account	of	client’s	turnover	and	auditor’s	taxable	income.	Third,	we	add	findings	for	a	quality	measure	that	has	not	earlier	been	tested	in	this	context,	peer	review	quality	 results	 (compliance	 with	 audit	 standards).	 Hardies	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 and	 Knechel	 at	 al.	(2013)	both	measure	audit	quality	as	a	propensity	to	give	a	modified	opinions	to	clients	that	represent	 a	material	 portion	 of	 their	 client	 portfolio.	 Fourth,	we	 are	 also	 testing	 for	 Finnish	data	 if	 auditor’s	 economic	position	 can	act	 as	 safeguard	against	potentially	 impaired	quality.	This	 question	 is	 rarely	 analyzed	 in	 audit	 research	 and	 there	 is	 lack	 of	 general	 empirical	evidence.	 Knechel	 et	 al.	 (2013)	 analyzed	 this	 question	 only	 for	 distressed,	 equity-lost,	 and	bankrupt	firms	showing	that	auditor’s	wealth	acts	as	a	safeguard	only	for	distressed	firms.		This	 study	 makes	 use	 of	 a	 very	 special	 data	 based	 on	 peer	 review	 results	 of	 264	 Finnish	auditors.	These	data	provide	us	with	an	excellent	opportunity	to	test	the	research	hypotheses	because	the	review	is	based	on	engagements	with	a	very	important	client	and	with	a	randomly	selected	average	client.	The	comparison	of	the	quality	of	audit	in	terms	of	peer	review	in	these	two	engagements	for	each	auditor	makes	it	possible	to	assess	the	effect	of	client	importance	at	the	 individual	 audit	 partner	 level.	 The	 data	 also	 include	 background	 information	 about	 the	auditor	and	about	his	or	her	earned	and	unearned	annual	income	from	the	year	of	peer	review.	In	Finland,	taxable	wealth	is	not	public	as	it	is	in	Sweden	(Knechel	et	al.	2013).	Therefore,	we	use	taxable	unearned	income	(capital	gains)	as	a	proxy	of	wealth.		The	 empirical	 evidence	 shows	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 audit	 and	 the	 independence	 of	 auditors	 in	terms	 of	 economic	 bonding	 are	 very	 high	 in	 Finland.	 High	 quality	 is	 reflected	 by	 high	compliance	with	audit	standards.	The	differences	in	peer	reviewed	quality	in	audit	for	the	big	client	 and	 small	 client	 engagement	were	 found	 to	 be	negligible	 and	 seemingly	 random.	This	obviously	 led	 to	 very	 low	 coefficients	 of	 determination	 in	 regression	 equations	 when	
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explaining	 these	 differences.	 However,	 our	 evidence	 showed	 that	 the	 effects	 of	 auditor’s	income	measures	and	big	client’s	turnover	on	the	difference	are	statistically	significant.	Firstly,	evidence	 showed	 that	 the	 difference	 is	 larger;	 the	 bigger	 is	 the	 big	 client’s	 turnover.	 This	finding	supports	H1	and	 indicates	 that	Finnish	auditors	are	 likely	 to	provide	more	 important	clients	with	marginally	higher	audit	quality.	Thus,	auditors	are	not	willing	to	compromise	audit	quality	due	to	economic	bonding	but	merely	use	a	strategy	to	build	a	reputation	by	providing	higher	than	expected	quality	 for	 important	clients.	This	evidence	is	consistent	with	empirical	evidence	that	auditors	are	more	conservative	with	clients	that	are	most	important	(Reynolds	and	Francis	2001;	Gaver	and	Paterson,	2007;	Knechel	et	al.	2013).		Secondly,	the	study	also	gives	new	evidence	on	the	role	of	income	in	safeguarding	the	auditor	from	economic	bonding.	Evidence	shows	that	the	level	of	annual	earned	income	(salaries)	does	not	 act	 as	 a	 safeguard	 against	 bonding	but	 on	 the	 contrary	 increases	 the	 difference	 in	 audit	quality	between	big	and	small	client	engagements.	This	means	that	the	difference	is	larger;	the	higher	 are	 auditor’s	 annual	 salaries.	 In	 practice,	 this	 finding	 can	 indicate	 that	 competent	auditors	with	high	salaries	are	likely	to	provide	important	customers	with	exceptionally	good	quality.	However,	evidence	shows	that	unearned	income	or	capital	gains	(as	a	proxy	of	wealth)	acts	 as	 a	 safeguard	against	 this	kind	of	 strategy	 consistently	with	H2.	Thus,	 the	difference	 in	audit	 quality	 between	 big	 and	 small	 clients	 is	 lower;	 the	 higher	 are	 capital	 gains	 got	 by	 the	author.	 This	 negative	 effect	 is	 however	 effective	 only	 for	 a	 part	 (17-18%)	 of	 auditors,	 since	capital	gains	must	be	significant	(at	least	22%	of	total	income)	to	make	safeguarding	effective.				The	partial	results	considering	different	parts	of	overall	audit	quality	showed	that	the	effects	of	economic	 bonding	 and	 safeguarding	 are	 not	 similar	 for	 all	 parts	 of	 audit	 process.	 However,	they	 obviously	 give	 partial	 support	 to	H1	 and	H2.	 Evidence	 shows	 that	 auditors	with	 higher	annual	 income	 are	 likely	 to	make	 better	 quality	 for	 big	 clients	 in	 conclusions	 and	 reporting	conforming	 to	 H2.	 Evidence	 also	 supports	 H1	 when	 showing	 that	 in	 a	 part	 of	 analytical	procedures	auditors	are	more	likely	to	provide	better	quality	to	big	clients;	the	more	important	is	 the	 client.	 For	 these	 analytical	 procedures	 the	 total	 and	 capital	 income	measures	 have	 a	negative	 coefficient	 giving	weak	 support	 for	 safeguarding	 (H2).	 These	 results	 are	 consistent	with	 previous	 studies,	 since	 such	 previously	 used	 audit	 quality	 measures	 as	 discretionary	accruals	(earning	management)	and	modified	audit	reports	are	focused	in	these	parts	of	audit	process	 (analytical	 procedures	 and	 conclusions	 and	 reporting)	 (Reynolds	 and	 Francis	 2001;	Gaver	and	Paterson,	2007;	Knechel	et	al.	2013).		The	scope	of	this	study	is	limited	in	many	respects.	First,	the	empirical	data	from	peer	reviews	is	only	got	from	auditors	having	private	firms	as	clients.	Therefore,	the	auditors	of	public	firms	are	 not	 included	 in	 this	 study	 and	 the	 results	 cannot	 potentially	 be	 generalized	 for	 these	auditors.	Secondly,	our	results	are	drawn	for	a	sample	of	auditors	in	Finland,	where	reputation	risk	and	litigation	risk	are	low.	Thirdly,	we	used	in	our	analyses	taxable	unearned	income	as	a	proxy	of	the	taxable	wealth	of	auditors	because	this	wealth	is	not	public	information	in	Finland.	Fourthly,	we	used	only	simple	statistical	methods	such	as	the	regression	analysis	in	analyzing	the	 data.	 Thus,	 future	 research	 should	 generalize	 the	 results	 and	 expand	 this	 kind	 of	 audit	quality	 analysis	 to	 auditors	 of	 public	 firms	 and	 to	 audit	 markets	 in	 other	 countries	 than	Finland.	 Moreover,	 future	 research	 should	 use	 more	 proper	 measures	 of	 wealth	 and	 more	advanced	statistical	methods.				
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APPENDICES	
	
Appendix	1.	Statistical	distributions	of	the	differences	in	compliance	with	standards	
between	big	and	small	clients.		 Difference	in	compliance	(%)		between	big	and	small	clients	in:	Percentile	 All	standards	 Planning	 audit	engagement	 Analytical	procedures	1	 Analytical	procedures	2	 Conclusions	 and	reporting	10	 -8,4894	 -15,3846	 -16,0079	 -14,1538	 -7,5188	15	 -6,0528	 -9,0909	 -11,3971	 -9,5141	 -5,2632	20	 -4,6154	 -7,6923	 -6,6666	 -7,0513	 -4,7619	25	 -2,9811	 -2,7778	 -5,2631	 -4,5454	 -0,6957	30	 -1,8448	 0,0000	 -3,6232	 -2,5641	 0,0000	35	 -1,4571	 0,0000	 -0,5848	 0,0000	 0,0000	40	 -0,8772	 0,0000	 0,0000	 0,0000	 0,0000	45	 -0,1254	 0,0000	 0,0000	 0,0000	 0,0000	50	 0,0000	 0,0000	 0,0000	 0,0000	 0,0000	55	 0,2554	 0,0000	 0,3676	 0,0000	 0,0000	65	 1,7669	 0,0000	 4,1667	 3,0960	 0,0000	70	 2,5641	 0,0000	 6,1404	 5,0000	 0,0000	75	 3,9474	 0,7576	 7,8432	 8,3334	 0,8281	80	 5,4546	 7,6923	 10,3261	 12,5000	 4,3478	85	 6,7099	 10,0000	 14,6199	 16,6667	 5,5556	90	 10,2843	 16,6667	 18,5185	 20,0000	 6,8421																										
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Appendix	2.	Pearson	correlations	of	the	dependent	and	independent	variables	(N=264).	
	 Number	of	variable:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 14	 15	 16	1.	Compliance	(%)	with	all	standards	 1,00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	2.	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	planning	audit	engagement	 0,69*	 1,00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	3.	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	analytical	procedures	1	 0,73*	 0,37*	 1,00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	4.	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	analytical	procedures	2	 0,58*	 0,25*	 0,15*	 1,00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	5.	Compliance	(%)	with	standards	in	conclusions	and	reporting	 0,61*	 0,24*	 0,19*	 0,36*	 1,00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	6.	Unearned	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 -0,06	 -0,07	 -0,01	 -0,07	 -0,02	 1,00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	7.	Total	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 0,02	 -0,06	 0,05	 0,02	 0,05	 0,23*	 1,00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	8.	Bigger	client	turnover	(thousands	of	Euro),	logarithm	 0,10	 0,11	 0,08	 0,12	 -0,04	 0,11	 0,06	 1,00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	9.	Full-time	auditor	(0	=	part-time,	1	=	full-time)	 0,07	 0,05	 0,03	 0,09	 0,02	 0,04	 -0,14*	 0,39*	 1,00	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	10.	Gender	of	auditor	(0	=	female,	1	=	male)	 0,01	 0,13	 0,05	 -0,06	 -0,11	 0,12	 0,14*	 0,18*	 0,07	 1,00	 	 	 	 	 	 	11.	CPA	exam	of	auditor	(0	=	HTM,	1	=	KHT)	 0,12	 0,08	 0,05	 0,14*	 0,06	 -0,01	 -0,03	 0,31*	 0,31*	 0,16*	 1,00	 	 	 	 	 	12.	Company	form	of	auditor	(0	=	private,	1	=	company)	 0,00	 -0,01	 -0,07	 0,07	 0,07	 -0,12	 0,01	 0,08	 0,28*	 -0,05	 0,10	 1,00	 	 	 	 	
13.	Age	of	auditor	 -0,06	 -0,03	 0,04	 -0,06	 -0,12	 0,27*	 0,05	 0,08	 0,07	 0,17*	 -0,10	 -0,21*	 1,00	 	 	 	
14.	Age	of	CPA	exam	 0,01	 0,05	 0,08	 -0,01	 -0,10	 0,22*	 0,06	 0,18*	 0,12	 0,25*	 -0,05	 -0,15*	 0,73*	 1,00	 	 	15.	Number	of	annual	engagements,	logarithm	 -0,06	 -0,04	 -0,03	 -0,08	 -0,02	 0,17*	 0,08	 0,41*	 0,48*	 0,13*	 0,06	 0,14*	 0,26*	 0,30*	 1,00	 	16.	Number	of	annual	hours	in	audit	work	 0,02	 0,02	 0,02	 -0,04	 0,05	 0,14*	 0,10	 0,44*	 0,56*	 0,16*	 0,21*	 0,15*	 0,19*	 0,28*	 0,77*	 1,00	Note:	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	*	=	2-tailed	probability	less	than	5%	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 																
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Appendix	3.	Regression	model	for	compliance	(%)	with	all	standards	(dependent	
variable)	for	small	clients	(N=264).	Independent	variable	 Coefficient	 t	statistic	 p-value#	Constant	 45,534	 2,026	 0,044	Unearned	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 -0,017	 -0,052	 0,959	Total	annual	income	(Euro),	logarithm	 3,140	 1,841	 0,067	Big	client	turnover	(thousands	of	Euro),	logarithm	 -0,675	 -0,520	 0,604	Full-time	auditor	(0	=	part-time,	1	=	full-time)	 5,244	 1,573	 0,117	Gender	of	auditor	(0	=	female,	1	=	male)	 1,921	 0,627	 0,531	CPA	exam	of	auditor	(0	=	HTM,	1	=	KHT)	 -1,613	 -0,464	 0,643	Company	form	of	auditor	(0	=	private,	1	=	company)	 -0,081	 -0,020	 0,984	Age	of	auditor	 0,010	 0,040	 0,968	Age	of	CPA	exam	 -0,405	 -1,903	 0,058	Number	of	annual	engagements,	logarithm	 1,670	 0,799	 0,425	Number	of	annual	hours	in	audit	work	 0,002	 0,418	 0,677	Coefficient	of	determination	(R-Square)	(adjusted)	 0,071	 (0,030)	 	F	statistic	(significance)	 1,746	 (0,064)	 	Note:	 	 	 	#	=	2-tailed	probability	 	 	 																															
